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EMMA AND THE OTHERS 
Abstract
There are some others whom we will never have the chance to meet because they do not 
exist: Emma Bovary, Anna Karenina and Nana, for instance. The reason they are some-
thing different from us may seem obvious; they are, after all, fictional entities. But what 
does it mean when we say that they do not exist? That they are nothing at all, or that they 
are simply different from us? By assuming a realist ontological perspective we will explain 
what sort of things fictional literary entities are, comparing them both to existing and to 
non-existing entities that resemble them in some respects (what is the difference between the 
historical Napoleon and the Napoleon in War and Peace? Are there similarities between 
fictional entities as created entities and other artifacts?). Finally, we will determine which 
theory gives the best account of fictional entities as things other than ourselves. 
Introduction
Who is Emma? What is this essay about? It is not about the accusations 
of political immobilism expressed in March of 2011 by the then-president of 
Confindustria, Emma Marcegaglia, towards the government, nor is it about the 
appeal of the then-vice president of the Italian Senate, Emma Bonino, to suspend 
the treaty between Italy and Libya. The Emma in question here is another. It 
is Emma Bovary, a fictional character. Fictional characters are the others who, 
in theory, we will never meet, because they do not exist: Emma Bovary, Anna 
Karenina, Nana, Lady Chatterley and Juliet (we will include the latter so as to 
not run the risk of showing interest in only one kind of other).
Despite their differences, one thing can be affirmed about these women straight-
away: they do not exist. But what does it mean to say that they do not exist? Does 
it mean that they are nothing? Or rather that they are in a different way than we, 
as real people, exist? How can we characterize the others that populate novels? By 
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assuming a realist ontological perspective, we will consider what sorts of things 
fictional characters are, what they have in common with other entities that exist or 
have existed and that might resemble them in some aspects (are the Napoleon in 
War and Peace and the historical Napoleon the same? If – as some claim – Flaubert 
had indeed been inspired by the real events of Delphine Couturier Delamare when 
writing the story of Madame Bovary, must we then conclude that Madame Bovary 
actually existed?), and, finally, we will decipher the most appropriate position for 
considering Madame Bovary and her kin as other than us, strictly speaking.
1. Literary Objects
Emma and the others are entities that populate novels: both the novels whose 
storylines are entirely invented by authors (though they are in some way inspired 
by reality, as in the case of Madame Bovary, and the incident of Delphine Cou-
turier) and those whose individuals and events are directly imported from reality 
(as the Napoleon in War and Peace). The entities that populate novels are what 
we normally call “characters”, that are other than us, in many senses.
What sorts of things are characters? Who are the others found in literary works? 
Who is Madame Bovary?
We might attempt to answer this question by using the following sentences:
(1) Madame Bovary is an unhappy woman married to a mediocre provincial 
doctor
(2) Madame Bovary is the main character of a famous novel by Flaubert
(3) Madame Bovary is the daughter of Père Rouault and she went to school in 
Rouen, in an Ursuline convent
Or we might want to explain who Emma Bovary is by comparing her to in-
dividuals who are in some way similar to her, such as Anna Karenina and Lady 
Diana in the following sentences:
(4) Madame Bovary is more stupid than Anna Karenina
(5) Madame Bovary is sad and disappointed with her husband, like Lady Diana
Perhaps we would prefer to explain who Madame Bovary is by making refer-
ence to her lovers or to who inspired Flaubert to write her story. 
(6) Madame Bovary is a woman who had two lovers: Rodolphe and Léon
(7) Madame Bovary is actually Delphine Couturier
Or we might consider it more correct to say that Madame Bovary cannot 
possess any characteristics, seeing as though she does not exist, and therefore 
choose to support what is affirmed by the sentence: 
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(8) Madame Bovary is nothing and no one because she does not exist
It should be evident how these different sentences, having “Madame Bovary” 
as their object, are not all of the same kind: some are true in the story, some are 
true in reality, and others consist of a sort of comparison between what is true 
in the story and what is true in reality. It is not clear if sentence (8) is true or not 
as its truth value depends on how we consider the relationship between literary 
objects, the properties that define them and existence. In reality, depending 
on our theory of fictitional objects, there are different ways to treat the various 
sentences; at this time we will deal with the final sentence, the most important 
to take into consideration in order to understand if and to what degree fictitious 
objects can be other than us, or if they are simply nothing. 
2. Objects That Do Not Exist?
What relationship is there between the properties that characterize an object 
and its potential existence? Must one exist in order to be married to a provincial 
doctor? Must one exist in order to be more or less famous than Anna Karenina? 
Are the properties that an object possesses all the same or, to paraphrase Gareth 
Evans1, could we postulate something such as “The varieties of properties”? 
Can two objects with a different metaphysical status share the same property 
or relationship? Or can a literary object such as Madame Bovary, for example, 
share certain properties with Lady Diana? Finally (even if, strictly speaking, the 
answer to this question conditions the answer to all of the previous questions), 
is it possible to have certain properties and to be a non-existent object? There 
have been two types of responses to this last question on behalf of philosophers: 
negative and affirmative. 
Let us begin with the negative response and – keeping in mind that both 
responses are based on the assumption that in order to define the ontological 
status of literary objects we must first consider the definition of object – let us 
ask ourselves the question: what is an object? Do an object and existence make a 
whole? According to Bertrand Russell2 an object and existence are synonymous, 
as evidenced by the analyses he proposes sentences undergo: in “There is an x such 
that x is…”, existence is explicitly considered part of the nature of the object. 
Russell claims that “Unicorns exist” and “There are unicorns” have the exact same 
meaning and it is no coincidence that he formalizes both by using $xUx. This is 
clearly a formalization that already incorporates a metaphysics according to which 
“there is” and “exists” are both exemplified by the existential quantifier “$”, which 
amounts to saying that that which exists completes that which there is. According 
to this sort of position, fictitious objects – which surely do not exist – constitute a 
1 Evans 1982.
2 Russell 1905a.
99
problem and, consequently, are to be eliminated. Through paraphrasing, Russell’s 
analysis eliminates all of the expressions which, like “the unicorn”, appear to be 
terms, and, therefore, denote individuals, when in reality, as demonstrated by the 
profound logical structure that has emerged through the analysis, this is not so. It is 
an interesting approach in that it is certainly not an ontologically binding one, even 
if one of its consequences is that every sentence which features the term “Madame 
Bovary” must first be considered false, which may appear to be an excessive result. 
The weighty consequences of this position, which is defined as “eliminative”, 
have rendered the persuasive charge of a diametrically opposed theoretical pro-
posal such as that of Alexius Meinong3 a noteworthy one. Characterized by an 
unparalleled ontological generosity, Meinong steadfastly maintains the distinction 
between object and existence by arguing that an object can be characterized by 
certain properties independently of the fact that it exists (spatio-temporally), 
subsists (ideally) or even simply does not exist. This is made possible by the 
postulation that the is of the predication is distinct from the is of the being. 
According to this perspective, then, the circumstance in which an object enjoys 
certain properties does not necessarily imply that an object with such properties 
exists: something can be without existing. The chimera is an animal with the 
head of a lion, the body of a goat and the tail of a snake, and the fact that it is a 
non-existent object does not constitute a problem. A sentence such as, “Madame 
Bovary is an unhappy woman” is a normal sentence with a subject-predicate form, 
just as the sentence “Carla Bruni is a former model”, and it does not require 
paraphrasing or particular analyses in order to be understood. 
These two opposing positions, along with their variations, remain at the heart 
of the debate on literary objects and, more generally, on fictitious entities. In fact, 
the theories discussed today can be divided into two groups, according to their 
answer to the question, “are there things like literary objects?”: those who answer 
negatively adopt an eliminative position, while those who answer affirmatively 
take on a realist position. We will now consider some realist positions – the only 
ones according to which, strictly speaking, literary objects are something and 
can, therefore, also be others – in order to clarify what sorts of things fictitious 
characters are and how they distinguish themselves from us (that is to say, in 
what sense they are others). 
3. Emma And The Others Are Objects 
Let us attempt to examine the realist positions according to which Emma 
Bovary and her kin are to be admitted to our ontological inventory (which is 
the list of all that there is) insofar as objects in the strict sense, which are not 
reducible to mere appearances derived from improper usages of language. What 
sorts of objects are literary objects? 
3 Meinong 1904.
100
According to some neo-Meinongian thinkers, such as Edward Zalta4, Madame 
Bovary is indeed a woman, but not in the same way as one can consider Carla 
Bruni a woman (and it is not just a matter of beauty): in fact, while the former 
is limited to internally possessing or codifying the property of being a woman, the 
latter not only codifies this property but she exemplifies it, that is, she external-
ly possesses it, in the world, and not simply by definition (as is the case when 
properties are possessed internally). Assuming that objects do not all enjoy the 
properties that characterize them in the same way, this position calls for a dou-
ble predication, two different ways that objects can possess the properties they 
possess (internally/externally; codification/exemplification). From this point 
of view, then, the property of being a confused and unhappy woman (and of 
having studied with the Ursulines, of having a daughter named Berthe, etc.) 
is internally predicated within Madame Bovary, while the property of being a 
character created by Flaubert (or of being as famous as Anna Karenina, of being 
the symbol of feminine stupidity, etc.) is predicated externally. In this case, the 
difference between us and Emma and the others is that, unlike in their case, we 
enjoy our properties in an exclusively external fashion. 
According to other neo-Meinongian thinkers such as Terence Parsons5, there 
is only one way an object can possess its properties, and these properties are of 
two different kinds: nuclear or extra-nuclear. The difference is that while nucle-
ar properties constitute the essence and the nature of the object, extra-nuclear 
properties simply concern the way the object is (if it exists in space and time, 
if it exists only in time, and so on). In the case of literary objects, the nuclear 
properties are those attributed by the author to the object within the narration, 
while the extra-nuclear properties are those attributed by adopting an external 
point of view regarding the story. Emma is, therefore, an object characterized 
on the one hand by nuclear (or constitutive) properties such as being a woman, 
having a husband and two lovers and, on the other hand, by extra-nuclear (or 
non-constitutive) properties such as being the protagonist of one of the first 
examples of a realist novel and expressing the dissatisfaction of the bourgeoisie 
through her anxieties. According to this position, Madame Bovary is a woman 
who is exactly the same as Carla Bruni: both have the internal property of being 
a woman, even if the latter exists and is a complete object (that is, one that is 
determined with regard to all of the properties) while the former is not. Clear-
ly, from this perspective, fictitious objects as well as real objects are defined as 
corresponding to properties or groups of properties. 
Both neo-Meinongian positions present an immediate advantage by making 
it possible to establish the conditions of truth of sentences featuring terms that 
refer to literary objects. A sentence such as, “Madame Bovary is a woman,” is 
true if and only if the individual designated by the name “Madame Bovary” has 
4 Zalta 1983.
5 Parsons 1980.
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the property of being a woman (and here, according to the position adopted, we 
could either say that the literary object in question codifies that property or that 
the property falls under its nuclear properties). Of the two positions, the one 
that distinguishes between two modes of predication seems to be better than the 
one that admits two different kinds of properties6, especially because the latter 
does not appear to be able to provide a good criterion for differentiating nuclear 
properties from extra-nuclear properties (unless we make do with the criterion 
that nuclear properties are only and exclusively those directly attributed to the 
literary object by the author). 
Alongside these positions is another branch of realist thought – which recalls 
the theory of Roman Ingarden7 and takes the name artifactualism – according 
to which fictitional entities in literature, such as Emma Bovary, exist and are 
objects for all intents and purposes, despite their having nothing in common 
(metaphysically speaking) with Carla Bruni and with us in general, on the one 
hand because they are more similar to objects such as tables and chairs – that 
is, artifacts – and on the other hand because they have many characteristics in 
common with numbers and ideas, that is to say with abstract objects8. This is the 
reason for which fictitious entities, together with games and laws, are defined as 
abstract artifacts which, after being created (the act of creation is fundamental), 
become public objects that are accepted by the community of critics and readers. 
Emma Bovary, therefore, is an abstract artifact created by Gustave Flaubert and a 
literary object created by the community of critics and readers. According to this 
theory, the readers are those who, through their beliefs and practices, determine 
the ontological status of such entities. In this case, the difference between us, 
mere mortals, and Emma and her kin is that we are not abstract artifacts, but 
rather people – concrete natural objects; simply put, we are quite the contrary. 
The artifactualist position is particularly interesting because, while it does not 
promote excessive requests from an ontological point of view, it is accountable 
for many sentences that contain terms referring to literary entities. 
It is evident that, from an ontological point of view, the neo-Meinongian 
proposals are decidedly more daring than the artifactualist ones: it is one thing 
to say that Madame Bovary is a woman just like Carla Bruni or that she codifies 
certain properties that real people exemplify, but it is another thing to say that 
Madame Bovary is an object similar to a game or a law. In this last case, the kind 
of object admitted is metaphysically less demanding in that it is similar to other 
objects that are already included in our inventory. Though it is less demanding 
it is not without a cost, as Stephen Yablo9 rightly observes when highlighting 
how, despite being “light”, the fictitious object of the artifactualists is not exempt 
6 Voltolini 2010: 70.
7 Ingarden 1931.
8 Van Inwagen 1977, Thomasson 1999.
9 Yablo 1999.
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from confusion (metaphysical-existential): one day she lives, has children, eats 
and has lovers and the next she is a literary figure who, as such, cannot eat or 
have lovers more than the number 7 can part its hair to the side. This happens 
because, according to the artifactualists, even if in the homonymous novel Emma 
Bovary is described as a person, in reality she is not a person, but rather an abstract 
artifact that passes for a person. From this perspective, the novel Madame Bovary 
assumes the traits of a surreal story in which certain entities with the vivacity of 
a number or of a theorem come to life and spend their days among thousands of 
vicissitudes until reaching death. Finally, by failing to refer to the properties that 
constitute the characters within a story (since they would be properties that the 
characters do not truly possess) the artifactualist theories fail to strictly specify 
the identity conditions of the characters10. 
Yet, neo-Meinongian and artifactual theories are not necessarily incompatible: 
one need only consider the convincing syncretic theoretical proposals made by 
Edward Zalta11 and Alberto Voltolini12. 
Other realist positions are those defended by proponents of possible13 and im-
possible14 worlds, according to which fictitional entities exist in flesh and blood, 
albeit in spatio-temporal worlds that are causally separate from ours. According 
to this perspective, while she does not exist in the real world, Emma Bovary 
exists as a woman in the flesh in other worlds. This is a very plausible position 
at an intuitive level: it would seem reasonable to acknowledge that Madame 
Bovary is what she is in her world, the world created by Flaubert. In this case, 
the difference between us and creatures like Emma is simply that, while we live 
in the real world, they live in other worlds, though all are equally women in the 
flesh. However, this theoretical perspective is not exempt from problems either: in 
fact, despite the fact that it accounts for internal sentences (those which state that 
Madame Bovary is a woman, has a husband and a daughter) with great facility, it 
encounters grave difficulties when attempting to explain mixed sentences (those 
which compare one fiction with other fictions or one fiction with reality, such 
as, “Madame Bovary and Lady Diana are both unhappy, but Madame Bovary 
is more stupid”). In fact, a comparison between various objects of fiction or 
between objects of fiction and real objects would be admissible only provided 
that all of the individuals involved belonged to the same world, a condition that 
is not initially respected by these theories which admit literary objects and place 
them in their respective worlds. 
Generally speaking, non-Meinongian realist theories present a solid plausi-
bility and resolve various problems, yet they all have the defect of being rather 
10 Voltolini 2010: 84.
11 Zalta 2000.
12 Voltolini 2006.
13 Lewis 1978.
14 Priest 2005, Berto 2010.
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ontologically demanding (despite what they may have initially appeared as, but 
still in a different way than the Meinongian theories) in that they admit either 
a multiplicity of worlds, or that abstract objects marry, betray each other and 
then cause us to feel emotions through their misadventures. 
In summarizing the four realist positions presented, we find that the 
neo-Meinongians of the two modes of predication distinguish an internal 
predication (codification) from an external predication (exemplification); the 
neo-Mei nongians of the two kinds of properties differentiate nuclear (or con-
stitutive) properties from extra-nuclear (or non-constitutive) properties; the 
artifactualists sustain that literary objects are abstract objects which historically 
and rigidly depend on their authors and constantly and generically depend on 
literary works; lastly, for theorists of possible and impossible worlds, fictitious 
objects exist, albeit in worlds that are spatio-temporally and causally separate 
from our own. 
4. Fictitional Objects, Real Problems
Let us now briefly examine certain obstacles that realist positions must face.
4.a Identity. One classic problem concerns the criteria of identity of characters 
(certainly not a trivial question, if we think of Quine’s motto, “no entity without 
identity”). Both neo-Meinongians and artifactualists relativize the identity of 
a character to the work or to the series of works written by a certain author in 
which said character appears. Yet, how are we to consider a character appearing 
in two different works written by two different authors15? In other words, is the 
Ulysses in the Odyssey identical to the Ulysses in the Divine Comedy (so as to 
avoid citing the famous Menard case from Borges’ tale)? It would not suffice to 
make reference to a core of characterizing properties that a fictitious individual 
must necessarily possess in order to be that same fictitious individual x, as is 
the practice of the neo-Meinongians of the two kinds of properties16, because 
in reality, according to how it is specified, the core of characterizing properties 
causes him to be identified either too much or too little, and the problem 
therefore endures. The response from the artifactualists is no more satisfactory: 
according to them, even if the character seems to remain the same because the 
properties mobilized in the respective narrations are the same, in reality, this is 
not the case because at the heart of the two narrations, there are two different 
authors17. Remaining within the artifactualist perspective, how can we truly 
determine the identity of fictitious literary objects if the properties they actually 
15 Voltolini 2010: 74.
16 Parsons 1980: 188.
17 Thomasson 1999: 6-7, 56.
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enjoy are the properties predicated outside of the narration; that is, those through 
which fictitious objects appear all alike18? 
4.b Properties. Another point concerns the way in which properties char-
acterize literary objects. What does it mean to say that Madame Bovary has 
a certain property, such as the property of being a woman? Does she have the 
property of being a woman the same way she has the property of having been 
created by Flaubert or of being less famous than Anna Karenina? According to 
the neo-Meinongians of the two kinds of properties, as we have seen, Madame 
Bovary has all of her properties in the same way, yet the properties are not all 
of the same kind: in fact, while the property of being a woman is an internal 
property possessed both by Madame Bovary and Carla Bruni, the property of 
being less famous than Anna Karenina is an external property, which does not 
have to do with the nature, or the essence, of Madame Bovary. But what is the 
difference between possessing a nuclear property and possessing an extra-nuclear 
property? The proponents of this position do not tell us, or rather, they say that 
there is no difference, though this is clearly not the case. We might find, then, 
that the proposal of the neo-Meinongians of the two modes of predication is 
more convenient, according to whom Madame Bovary has the property of being 
a woman differently from how she has the property of having been created by 
Flaubert, because, while she possesses internally the property of being a woman, 
she possesses externally, in our world, the property of having been created by 
Flaubert. But what does it mean to “possess internally”? Here too, the response 
on behalf of theorists has not been satisfactory. Might this problem be resolved 
more effectively by the defenders of the artifactualist position? Certainly not. 
In fact, compared to previous proposals, they present even more difficulties as 
they consider fictitious entities as abstract artifacts and, therefore, must be able 
to explain how it is possible for an abstract artifact to possess properties such 
as having black hair or a daughter named Berthe. How can they account for 
the properties that literary objects possess within the story if they claim that 
everything that is said about them in the story is false? 
4c. Underdetermination and Overdetermination. Let us take the sentence:
(9) Madame Bovary has a mole on her right shoulder
This is an underdetermined sentence as there are no elements in Flaubert’s 
novel that lead us to consider it to be true or to be false, and it is highly im-
probable that further research could add something to what we already know 
(unless, of course, we were to find a secret document in which Flaubert had 
mapped out the moles of Madame Bovary). This is so because literary objects 
18 Voltolini 2010: 81.
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are incomplete, which means that there are certain properties which they are 
characterized by, and with regards to which it is neither true nor false that such 
objects possess them. The incompleteness of objects of fiction (and here we are 
dealing with the ontological incompleteness of things, and not the epistemological 
incompleteness, which concerns not knowing if something – which possesses or 
does not possess a certain property – possesses or does not possess that specific 
property) represents a rather grave problem in that it constitutes a violation of 
the principle of the excluded middle, according to which either the property 
P or its opposing non-P are possessed by an object, without other possibilities. 
A contrary case is that of overdetermined sentences, which occurs when 
there are elements that lead us to consider such sentences to be both true and 
false, as would be the case in the aforecited sentence if in Flaubert’s novel there 
were evidence both of its falseness and of its truth. If Flaubert had written that 
Madame Bovary had a single mole and he had then described this mole once 
as being located on her right shoulder and again as being located on her neck, 
then it would be true both that the mole was on her right shoulder and that 
the mole was on her neck; yet, if it remains true that Madame Bovary has one 
single mole, then clearly we would be lead to reach a contradictory conclusion. 
Fictitious objects can, therefore, also be contradictory and impossible objects, 
in many ways similar to the highly criticized square circle19. 
Clearly, the fact that literary objects present characteristics such as incom-
pleteness or contradictoriness does not work in their favor. In fact, it seems to 
constitute an excellent reason to side with those who claim that it is best to place 
a strict ban on the potential entrance of such objects into our ontology. Further-
more, it was the very violation of the principle of non-contradiction and of the 
excluded middle that lead Russell to embrace a “robust sense of reality” and to 
categorically refuse similar objects20. Meinong’s response, on the other hand, was 
that only existent objects, not all objects, must not violate the aforementioned 
principles21. In any case, the problem persists. 
5. Madame Bovary: Other Than Whom?
When we think of Madame Bovary as an other we have something very specific 
in mind. We do not mean an entity that is internally a woman and externally 
a character, or that has the constitutive property of being a woman and the 
non-constitutive property of not existing, nor do we wish to refer to an abstract 
artifact that passes off as a woman but in reality is not one. When we say that 
Madame Bovary is other than us, what we have in mind is closer to what Edmund 
Husserl would say about the experience of the other, as something we can feel a 
19 Russell 1905b.
20 Barbero & Raspa 2005.
21 Meinong 1906-1907.
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sort of Einfühlung or empathy for, according to which the other is constituted 
by appresentation, such as an other than I myself22. 
The other is other than me insofar as it is similar to me. In order for a literary 
entity like Madame Bovary to be the other, in order for her to be set against me, 
as I myself, she must exist as a woman in the flesh. It is not an insurmountable 
problem that she exists as a concrete individual in a world that is spatio-tempo-
rally and causally separate from my own; what is imperative is that she have the 
concrete modality of existence that is typical of human beings. 
From the point of view of the other, then, the only acceptable realistic solu-
tion is that of the possible and impossible worlds, according to which Madame 
Bovary lives in Yonville, is embittered and disappointed by her husband (just as 
Lady Diana – only she lives in a different world), has an overwhelming passion 
for fashion and, above all, is an entity that exists as you and I do. The kind of 
existence in question here could be defined as “having genuine causal powers”23, 
or simply as “having a spatio-temporal dimension”24. As an other of this kind, 
Madame Bovary undoubtedly becomes of interest to us, even if it is a decidedly 
inferior interest in relation to the one she inspires in professor Kugelmass, the 
protagonist of a famous short story by Woody Allen25. 
Professor Kugelmass teaches literature at the City College of New York. 
Frustrated by his second marriage to a very dull woman, he wishes to partake 
in rigorously extramarital sentimental-sexual adventures without running the 
risk of being caught and having to divorce. Hence Kugelmass begins his search 
for “others” with whom he can be unfaithful to his wife, and who won’t give 
him too many problems. This is how he becomes acquainted with a sort of 
magician by the name of Persky who has a Chinese cabinet (any reference to 
J.R. Searle’s Chinese room experiment is purely coincidental: Woody Allen’s 
story is from 1977, while the famous Searlian experiment is from 1980) which 
is able to transport people into the world of novels. Indeed, nothing seems 
more appropriate for satisfying his needs: he must simply be catapulted into 
the world of fiction, find an agreeable person with whom to have an adventure, 
and then, at the right time, be brought back into the real world. In fact, this is 
precisely what happens, at least to a certain degree: Kugelmass is catapulted to 
Yonville where he relishes with the most coquettish and unsatisfied woman of 
all novels, Madame Bovary. Yet, as may be expected, entering and exiting the 
world of fiction changes the course of things. How could we forget the reaction 
of the Stanford professor who, pleasantly surprised by the reading of the novel 
after Kugelmass’ umpteenth trip from one world to the other, tells his students: 
22 Husserl 1950.
23 Castañeda 1989.
24 Williamson 2002.
25 Allen 1977.
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«Well, I guess the mark of a classic is that you can reread it a thousand times 
and always find something new»26? 
Unfortunately, as in all acclaimed love stories, things between Madame 
Bovary and Professor Kugelmass become complicated, particularly when the 
Chinese cabinet is used not by the perfidious professor, but by the capricious 
young girl to go shopping in New York. The episode between the two is further 
complicated when the Chinese cabinet is unable to bring Madame Bovary back 
to Yonville, keeping her in the real world beyond the time permitted and risking 
the highly dangerous metaphysical mutation that transforms a literary object 
into a common lover. Things are later resolved, as in all celebrated love stories, 
yet the threat was substantial. 
In any case, Kugelmass was able to love Madame Bovary, watch her and search 
for her, precisely because she was the same as a real woman in many regards, 
with the exception of her spatio-temporal collocation. This is why the concept 
of fictitious literary objects offered by the theorists of possible and impossible 
worlds is the most advisable in accounting for fictitious literary objects insofar 
as others: because it presents them as being metaphysically similar to us, with the 
only difference being that of living in different worlds. Nonetheless, as fascinating 
as it may be, the theory of possible and impossible worlds is very dangerous. One 
need only think of what happens to the poor professor who at the end of the 
extraordinary incident is able to send Madame Bovary back to Yonville for good, 
but, still in search of secure adventures in other worlds, is transported by mistake 
into the pages of the textbook, Remedial Spanish. There, he not only avoids all 
risks, but he experiences the thrill of living in a world of syllables and accents.
Apart from what Madame Bovary might be, what is it that we truly like about 
her (independently of Kugelmass)? Perhaps, deep down, it is the very fact that, 
whatever she may be, she can never be other than ourselves, strictly speaking, 
because a magic cabinet will never allow us to meet her and know her – for the 
simple reason that Madame Bovary is not someone whom one meets. In relation 
to us, it could be objected, she is really a kind of different thing. 
26 Ivi: 38.
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